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Abstract
This paper identifies six main theories of the determinants of social trust, and tests them
against survey data from seven nations, 1999-2001. Three of the six theories of trust fare
rather poorly and three do better. First and foremost, social trust tends to be high among
citizens who believe that there are few severe social conflicts and where the sense of
public safety is high. Second, informal social networks are associated with trust. And
third, those who are successful in life trust more, or are more inclined by their personal
experience to do so.  Individual theories seem to work best in societies with higher levels
of trust, and societal ones in societies with lower levels of trust. This may have something
to do with the fact that our two low trust societies happen to have experienced
revolutionary change in the very recent past, so that societal events have overwhelmed
individual circumstances.
Woher kommt Vertrauen in die Mitmenschen? In diesem Arbeitspapier werden Umfra-
gedaten aus sieben Ländern verwendet, um die Stichhaltigkeit verschiedener Theorien
über die Bedingungen für soziales Vertrauen auf der Individualebene zu überprüfen. Nur
drei der sechs Theorien erweisen sich als erklärungskräftig. Erstens zeigen jene Bürger
großes Vertrauen, die die Gesellschaft als wenig konfliktbelastet und als sicher wahrneh-
men. Zweitens gehen gute informelle Sozialkontakte mit Vertrauen Hand in Hand. Und
drittens sind die im Leben Erfolgreichen vertrauensvoller als die Verlierer. Die Ergeb-
nisse zeigen darüber hinaus, daß individuenbezogene Theorien offenbar in „high-trust“-
Gesellschaften besser funktionieren, während gesellschaftsbezogene Theorien in „low-
trust“-Gesellschaften erklärungskräftiger sind. Ein Grund dafür könnte sein, daß die
beiden im Sample vertretenen Gesellschaften mit niedrigen Vertrauenswerten postsozia-
listische Länder sind, so daß die mit dem Zusammenbruch des Staatssozialismus und der
Transformation zu Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft verbundenen sozialen Umbrüche
individuelle Einflüsse in den Schatten stellen.
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1 Introduction
‘Trust is one of the most important synthetic forces within society.’
(Simmel 1950: 326)
There is a general consensus among contemporary social scientists that social trust is
important, as the small flood of recent publications on the topic shows.1 The interest in
trust covers, unusually in the increasingly fragmented and specialised academic world,
sociology, political science, economics, psychology, history, political theory and philos-
ophy, management and organisation studies, and anthropology. Trust, it is said, contrib-
utes to economic growth and efficiency in market economics, to the provision of public
goods, to social integration, co-operation and harmony, to personal life satisfaction, and
to democratic stability and development, and even to good health and longevity. Trust
is also at the centre of a cluster of other concepts that are no less important for social
science theory than for practical daily life, including life satisfaction and happiness,
optimism, well-being, health, economic prosperity, education, welfare, participation,
community, civil society, and democracy. And, of course, social trust is a core compo-
nent of social capital, and is normally used as a key indicator of it, sometimes as the best
or only single indicator.
If trust is indeed as important as this, then two questions follow. First, what, exactly,
does trust do for society and its individual members? And second, where does it come
from? We will not tackle the first question here, concentrating, instead, on the origins of
social trust. Our main concern is to provide evidence about what sorts of people express
social trust and distrust, and under what sorts of social, economic, and political
circumstances do they do so? If we can answer these general questions, then we may have
gone some way to solving the problem of the origins of social trust, and, in turn, make
some practical suggestions about how this powerful social good might be increased. For
this purpose we identify six theories of the origins of trust in this paper, and test their
explanatory power in six European and one non-European country. The empirical
material is drawn from the Euromodule surveys conducted between 1999 and 2001.
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2 Theories of the Origins of Social Trust
There are two broad schools of thought about trust. The first takes the view that trust is
an individual property and that it is associated with individual characteristics, either as
a core personality trait, or with individual social and demographic features such as class,
education, income, age, and gender. The second argues that social trust is a property not
of individuals but of social systems. According to this view the study of trust requires a
top-down approach that focuses on the systemic or emergent properties of societies and
their central institutions.
2.1 Individual Theories
According to a well-developed social-psychological school of thought in the United
States in the 1950s and 1960s, social trust is a core personality trait of individuals (see
Erikson 1950; Allport 1961; Cattell 1965; Rosenberg 1956, 1957). It is learned in early
childhood, and tends to persist in later life, changing only slowly as a result of experience
thereafter, especially traumatic experience. According to the social-psychologists, social
trust is part of a broader syndrome of personality characteristics that include optimism,
a belief in co-operation, and confidence that individuals can resolve their differences and
live a satisfactory social life together. Trust and optimism are part and parcel of the same
general disposition to the world. Conversely, distrusters are misanthropic personalities
who are also pessimistic and cynical about the possibilities for social and political co-
operation.
This approach to social trust has been developed recently by Eric Uslaner (1999,
2000), who argues that we learn trust early in life from our parents. His evidence from
two American panel studies shows that individual levels of interpersonal trust are among
the most stable survey items over time. He also concludes that social trust is not dependent
upon the experience of reciprocity.  Trusters are not simply paying back good deeds by
others, for those who were helped by others when they were young are no more trusting
than those who were not helped in this way. To reinforce the point about the social-
psychological origins of trust he argues that it is based on two other core personality
characteristics, optimism and the capacity to control the world, or at least one’s own life.
Optimism, he writes, leads to generalized trust (Uslaner 1999: 138). Finally, he argues
that subjective measures of well-being are more closely associated with trust than
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objective ones related to economic circumstances. In other words, trust is more closely
associated with the individual features of personality types and subjective feelings, than
with the external circumstances of economic life.
We will refer to the Erikson-Allport-Cattell-Uslaner approach to the explanation of
trust as Personality Theory. One clear implication of the theory is that social trust will be
most strongly associated with other personality variables, especially with measures of
personal optimism, and a sense of control over one’s own life.
Personality theory is to be distinguished from a second and rather different approach
that concentrates on individual variables, but not social-psychological ones. The basic
theory here is that while all trust carries risks, it is more risky for the poor than the rich.
The poor cannot afford to lose even a little of what they have if their trust is betrayed; the
rich stand to lose comparatively less, and they may gain comparatively more from trusting
behaviour (Banfield 1958: 110). The general theory is supported to some degree by
survey data provided by the World Values Studies and the American General Social
Survey which suggests that social trust tends to be expressed by the ‘winners’ in society,
as measured in terms of money, status, and high levels of job and life satisfaction, and
subjective happiness (Orren 1997; Newton 1999a: 173; Whiteley 1999: 40-41). ‘In
virtually all societies’, writes Putnam (2000: 138) ‘”have-nots” are less trusting than
“haves”, probably because haves are treated by others with more honesty and respect.’
In contrast distrust is more common among the losers – those with a poor education, low
income, and low status, and who express dissatisfaction with their life. Distrust also tends
to be expressed by victims of crime and violence, as well as the divorced. According to
this view, social trust is the product of adult life experiences; those who have been treated
kindly and generously by life are more likely to trust than those who suffer from poverty,
unemployment, discrimination, exploitation, and social exclusion. Inglehart (1999)
emphasises the close connection between social trust, happiness, and well-being, and so
does Putnam (2000: 332-5).
This sort of interpretation of trust is consistent with Patterson’s (1999: 187-91)
analysis of the relationship between trust, class and race in the USA. He finds that the
poorest in America are far less trusting than the richest, and that irrespective of income,
Afro-Americans are the least trusting ethnic group (see also Putnam 2000:138). Patterson
concludes (1999: 190) that ‘anxiety and insecurity are clearly the most powerful forces
driving distrust.’
In this paper, therefore, we distinguish between social-psychological theory, which
emphasises childhood socialisation and core personality characterstics, and what we will
term Success and Well-Being Theory, which stresses adult life experiences. The latter can
be tested by analysing the relationship between social trust and a set of individual
variables including income, social status, education, satisfaction with life, job satisfac-
tion, happiness, and anxiety.
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2.2 Societal Theories
The second major approach towards trust is to see it as a property of society rather than
individuals. Trust is not so much a core personality trait of individuals, but individuals
participate in, contribute to, or benefit from a trusting culture, or from social and political
institutions that encourages the development of trusting attitudes and behaviour.
According to this approach responses to the standard question on trust (‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?’) can be interpreted as the citizen’s estimation of the trustwor-
thiness of the society around them (Putnam 2000: 138; Newton 2001: 203-4). Trust, the
theory goes, is the product of experience (Hardin 1993) and we constantly modify and
update our trustful and distrustful feeling in response to changing circumstances. As a
result, levels of trust reported in social surveys are a good indicator of the trustworthiness
of the societies in which respondents live; the trust scores tell us more about societies and
social systems, than about the personality types living in them (Putnam 2000: 138). There
is some experimental evidence showing that countries with high trust scores in the World
Values surveys actually have more trustworthy and honest citizens (Knack and Keefer
1997: 1257).
This sort of interpretation of trust gains a degree of prima facae plausibility when we
see that countries like Brazil, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela are at the
lowest end of the international trust scale, while Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands,
Canada, Finland, Ireland, and Iceland are at the other end (Inglehart 1999: 102).
Whatever the distribution of trust scores of individuals within societies, richer and/or
more democratic nations are more trusting than poorer and less democratic ones. The
point is reinforced, if anything, by the fact that levels of social trust in West Germany rose
steadily from 9% in 1948 to 45% in 1993 (Cusack 1997).
If social trust is based upon the social circumstances in which people find themselves,
it should be statistically associated with societal variables. However, there is little
agreement about what variables are important. The classic view is that a society that is
well founded upon a large and varied range of voluntary associations and organisations
is likely to generate high levels of social trust. The theory, dating back to de Tocqueville
and John Stuart Mill, is central to most recent discussion of social capital (Putnam 2000).
We learn to participate by participating, and by participating in regular and close contact
with others on a voluntary basis we learn ‘the habits of the heart’ (Bellah et al. 1985) of
trust, reciprocity, co-operation, empathy for others, and an understanding of the common
interest and common good. The most important form of participation, from this point of
view, is direct, face-to-face, and sustained involvement in voluntary organisations in the
local community. This theory is referred to as the Voluntary Organisations Theory. It can
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be tested by using survey data to analyse the statistical association between levels of
social trust on the one hand, and membership of and activity in voluntary associations,
on the other.
Voluntary organisations theory has been criticised on both theoretical (see, for
example, Cohen 1999: 219-23; Newton 2001) and empirical grounds. Empirically there
is a certain amount of evidence to support the theory (see for example, Brehm and Rahn
1997; Stolle and Rochon 1999: 202-3, 2001) but often it is weak and patchy and fails tests
of statistical significance (Torcal and Montero 1996; van Deth 1996; Dekker and van den
Broak 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997: 1281-3; Torcal and Montero 1999: 177; Billiet and
Cambre 1999: 255; Newton 1999a, 1999b; Whiteley 1999: 40-41; Booth and Richard
2001: 50). Uslaner (1999: 145-6) states bluntly that we do not learn trust from people in
civic associations. Hooghe (2000: 5) is also clear on the point: ‘There is no indication
whatsoever that interaction with other group members would automatically lead to the
development of a more socially oriented  value pattern, to a rise in trust levels, or to
abandoning prejudices.’ In spite of its long and distinguished intellectual lineage,
therefore, the theory that membership of voluntary associations generates social trust
finds rather little supporting evidence in modern survey research.2
Some have argued that no matter how important formally organised voluntary
associations may be in some respects, what matters from the point of view of social trust
is direct participation in the social networks of everyday life (Yamagishi and Yamagishi
1993). For most people this means the informal relations of friends and family in the
community and the neighbourhood, and participation in social relations at the place of
work. It also means ad hoc and sporadic participation in the loose networks of people
who gather in local bars and pubs, at work, in book-reading groups, and support groups,
and among those who form car pools, baby sitting circles, and local action groups that
tend to cluster around schools, community centres, and residential areas (Gundelach and
Torpe 1996: 31; Parry et al. 1992: 86-87; Foley and Edwards 1997). It has been
suggested that such forms of civic engagement and social participation are increasing in
modern society (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 68-91; Schudson 1996: 17-18).
This approach, known here as Networks Theory, can be tested by analysing the
association between trust and involvement in informal social networks.
Personal social networks were particularly important in the Communist systems of
east and central Europe (Kolankiewicz 1994: 149-51; Sztompka 1996; Rose 2001).
People in these countries developed circles of private and unofficial contacts among
people who could help each solve the daily problems of scarce resources and services,
but within a wider society that was pervaded by general suspicion and mistrust created
by the state. As a result the form of social trust developed in Communist societies was
particularistic and limited, compared with the more generalised trust typically found in
the west. As Rose (1994: 29) succinctly puts it, ‘East Europeans know those whom they
trust, and trust those whom they know.’ In this case, network theory may be rather better
at explaining social trust in ex-Communist systems than western ones, or at least among
the older generation in ex-Communist countries.
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A different form of societal theory of trust concentrate on the characteristics of local
communities, rather than the informal social networks of people within them. Some
research finds that the smaller the urban unit, the higher trust is likely to be (House and
Wolf 1978). Putnam (2000: 205) concludes that “… residents of small towns and rural
areas are more altruistic, honest, and trusting than other Americans. In fact, even among
suburbs, smaller is better from the social capital point of view.’ Knack and Keefer (1997:
1283), however, find no cross-national evidence to suggest any connection between
social trust and either urbanization, or population density. If the community characteris-
tics emphasised by Community Theory are important one might expect trust levels to
correspond with such measures as city size, satisfaction with the community, and a sense
that the community is a safe place to be at night.
Community theory is different from explanations of trust that focus on the character-
istics of whole countries and nation state (see, for example, Pharr, Putnam and Dalton
2000: 26-7). Many have argued for this sort of ‘top-down’ approach, often as a
compliment rather than an alternative to ‘bottom’up’ approaches (Levi 1996; Tarrow
1996; Foley, Edwards and Diani 2001; Maloney, Smith, and Stoker 2001: 96). For
example, wealthier nations, and those with greater income equality, have higher levels
of trust than poorer and more inegalitarian ones (Ingelhart 1999; Knack and Keefer
1997:1279). Democracies are more trusting than non-democracies (Booth and Richard
2001: 55; Newton 2001), countries with universal welfare benefits are more trusting than
those with selective welfare systems (Rothstein and Stolle 2001), and countries with
independent courts and institutional controls over the power of political executives are
more trusting than others. There is also evidence that social trust is higher in societies with
lower levels of social polarization, as measured by income equality and ethnic homoge-
neity (Knack and Keefer 1997: 1282-3). This suggests that societies with cleavages
between class, income, or ethnic groups are likely to have lower levels of social trust.
This top-down, total society approach to trust is named Societal Theory here. It will
be tested by relating variations in trust with reported feelings about the intensity of
conflict in society (conflict in general and more specifically between income groups,
class, and nationals and immigrants), and about political freedom, public safety, and
satisfaction with democratic institutions. These are not objective measures of conflict or
freedom, such as Knack and Keefer (1997) use as their measures of polarization, but
rather respondents reported feelings about them in their country, which is another way
of measuring the degree of polarisation in society. Usually objective, aggregate variables
are used as indicators of social conflict and freedom, but we also know that populations
assess such circumstances in very different ways. Some perceive strong conflict within
their society, others do not. In this research we use citizen’s subjective assessments as our
indicator of social conflict and other societal conditions.
In the empirical work that follows we will use three demographic variables as controls
– age, education, and gender – because all three seem to have a bearing on trust. Various
studies have found evidence of life-cycle or cohort effects, or both (Patterson 1999: 182;
Torcal and Montero 1999: 174-81; Whiteley 1999: 40-41; Putnam 2000: 140-1; Newton
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2001), although the patterns are not always consistent or strong. It is possible that social
trust follows a U-curve, with the young (“never trust anyone over 30”) and the old and
vulnerable having higher levels of distrust.
Patterson (1999: 173) finds that women are sometimes significantly less trusting than
men in the USA, although gender makes little difference in other western countries
(Whiteley 1999: 41; Newton 2001). It is not clear why gender should make any
difference to trust, but perhaps gender discrimination makes women less socially
successful and satisfied with their life than men, or perhaps women with dependent
children are inclined to be cautious and distrustful as a result of their responsibility for
protecting their off-spring. Education has a great effect on social trust in the USA
(Putnam 2000), and in some other, but by no means all, western countries.
Table 1 summarises the theoretical argument so far. It lists the six major theoretical
approaches, and the variables that may be used as measures, indicators, or correlates to
test them. We will discuss the variables in the section that follows on methodology, but
meanwhile we should make some further important comments about the theories.
None of these different theories are mutually exclusive or incompatible. In the first
place, some of them are concerned with different types and levels of explanation: some
try to explain variations between individuals, others variations between countries; some
may be better suited to explaining variation at a given point in time, some to explaining
Table 1: Six theories of trust and related variables
Theories Variables 
Individual  
Personality theory Optimism, life control 
Success and well-being theory Income, social status, life satisfaction, job satisfaction, 
happiness, anxiety 
Social  
Voluntary organization theory Membership of voluntary associations  
Social network theory Networks of friends 
Community theory City size, satisfaction with the community, 
community safety 
Societal theory Social conflicts, satisfaction with democratic 
institutions, political freedom, public safety 
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changes over time.3 In the second place, while different theories may contribute to
explaining the origins of social trust, either separately or in combination, they may also
have different effects in different circumstances. And in the third place both the theories
and their indicators overlap to some extent. For example, optimism, anxiety and trust may
be treated as aspects of the same personality syndrome. However, while social-psychol-
ogy theory treats them as the long-lasting products of early socialisation, other theories
see them as the product of adult experience. Our intention in identifying six rather
different theories is not to pit one against the other, but to see which, if any, seems to fit
the facts better than others.
An example of how different theories might fit different circumstances is provided by
Uslaner (1999: 132-3), who observes that individual trust correlated more strongly with
voting turnout in the USA in the 1992 than in the 1964 election. In the earlier year, about
half the population expressed trust in their fellow citizens, and it could be that trust at this
high level pervades the whole of society to such an extent that it has a contextual effect
on all citizens, whether they had a personal propensity to trust or not. Hence all sorts of
people turned out to vote in 1964, with rather little difference according to social trust.
By 1992 trust had fallen to less than 40% in the USA, and was continuing to decline. At
this point, Uslaner suggests, individual trust mattered in the sense that trusters were
significantly more likely to vote. He concludes (Uslaner 1999: 133) that ‘individual trust
matters more when there is less social capital, while contextual trust counts more when
people have greater faith in each other.’
This raises the possibility that in low trust societies individual level variables will be
more closely associated with social trust, than in high trust societies, where societal
variables of a contextual nature are likely to be more important.We cannot test this
proposition rigorously with only seven countries, but nonetheless, we can rank our
nations according to their level of trust, to see if there is a shift in the relative strength of
individual and societal variables as the level of social trust changes.
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2.3 Problems of Cause and Effect
The study of trust is benighted by the problem of cause and effect. Do people become
more trusting as a result of close and sustained interaction with others in voluntary
organisations? Or is it, on the contrary, that trusting people join voluntary associations
and get involved with their community, leaving distrusting ones at home to watch the
television? Do people develop higher levels of trust because life has been kind to them,
or is life kind to them because they are trusting? Many have pointed out the severe
chicken-and-egg problem with most theories and empirical findings about of trust, and
we are unable to make much progress with the problem here. But it is worth making two
important, if preliminary, observations about cause and effect.
First, in this paper we look for close associations between a varied set of independent
variables and our measure of social trust.  If we find such associations, then we can begin
to worry about which is cause and which effect. If we do not find close associations, then
there are no problems of cause and effect to ponder on in the first place. Second, there
is no general rule about how to determine the direction of causal relations, at least when
one is dependent upon cross-sectional survey data. Each particular combination of
figures has to be examined independently to see what causal relations are plausible and
implausible. Suppose, for example, that we were to find no relationship between city size
and distrust, then we would not bother about cause and effect. But if we were to find a
strong association then it would be rather less plausible to argue that large cities attract
distrustful people (although this may happen), than that large cities generate a sense of
distrust because of their crime, impersonal relations, market relations, competition for
economic success, and pockets of extreme poverty side-by-side with extreme affluence.
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3 Empirical Test of Trust Theories
3.1 Methods
The empirical analysis in this paper is based upon data collected in the Euromodule
surveys conducted in Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, and Switzer-
land between 1999 and 2001.4 East and West Germany are kept separate because of
different socialisation experiences and living conditions. This gives us seven cases, and
for the sake of simplicity and brevity we refer to these as ‘countries’ or nations, although
actually, of course East and West Germany are one nation.
The selection of the countries for the Euromodule survey was not a theoretically
guided one. They happen to be the countries that have participated in the Euromodule
project so far, this being an international survey dedicated to comparative welfare
research and coordinated at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB). Basically
it is a survey concerned with individual living conditions, subjective well-being, and the
quality of society. The surveys are representative of citizens aged 18 and over, with
sample sizes between 1,000 and 2,500, except in East Germany, which had a sample size
of 473. Interviewing was face to face, except in Switzerland where telephone interviews
were used. Full details of the Euromodule, including the master questionnaire and study
descriptions are in Delhey et al. (2001).
The strengths of the survey for research on trust are considerable. First, it covers a
range of countries in both west and central Europe, and South Korea as a non-European
case, and presents us with a spread of trust scores from South Korea and Switzerland with
60% and 43%, to Hungary and Slovenia with 18% and 14% (see Table 2). The South
Korean figure may be a little high because the sample was limited to under 65 year olds
(in contrast to the other countries where all ages were sampled). But since we are
primarily interested in within country variations, this one difference in sampling will not
effect the results unduly, especially since we did not find variations in social trust were
related to age.
The Swiss figure is fairly typical of a group of relatively high trust nations in the 1990s,
including the USA, Australia, Austria, Spain, Britain, Iceland, West Germany, Japan,
Ireland, and Finland. The Slovenian figure falls at the lower end of the international trust
scores, alongside South Africa, Nigeria, Romania, Poland, Argentina, Estonia, Lithua-
nia, and Venezuela (for comparative trust figures see Inglehart 1999: 102).
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There are big differences between the countries in terms of modernisation, wealth, and
political history. South Korea also brings cultural and religious differences into the study.
In short, large national differences between our seven cases means that we have the sort
of most-dissimilar systems research design that is ideal for theory testing.
Second, the Euromodule survey brings together a broad range of questions not usually
combined in research on trust, and which enable us to test the theories outlined above.
The questionnaire covers a variety of subjective and objective measures, as well as
individual, communal and societal ones. It asks questions about social networks and
membership of voluntary organisations, as well as about social conflict and national
social and political conditions. In particular, it contains a long and varied battery of
questions about life satisfaction, job satisfaction, happiness, optimism, and anxiety that
are not often found alongside trust questions in other surveys. This enables us to examine
the association between trust and subjective well-being more systematically than before.
If social trust is associated with satisfaction and well-being then it has a better chance of
showing itself in this study than almost any other.
At the same time, the Euromodule data available to date covers only seven countries,
which is far too few for cross-national comparison. Consequently, we will stick mainly
to the sort of individual level analysis (within country variations between individuals) for
which the survey is ideally suited. In addition, the questionnaire includes only one item
on social trust, rather than the three-item Rosenberg scale. On the other hand, a great deal
of social trust research is based on World Values Survey, which also rely on the same,
single question, so at least the Euromodule is not disadvantaged to any great extent in this
respect.
Table 2: Trust in 7 countries
 Most people can be trusted  
(%) 
Valid N 
South Korea 60 1,000 
Switzerland 43 984 
East Germany 35 473 
West Germany 32 1,888 
Spain 28 2,381 
Hungary 18 1,422 
Slovenia 14 972 
 
Data: Euromodule 1999, 2000, 2001.
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In this study social trust is measured with the standard survey research question:
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’
Those who say that most people can be trusted are given a score of 1, and those who say
you can’t be too careful are scored 0. Since this measure is a discrete or binary one, and
since the assumptions of ordinary least square regression do not apply (Whitehead
undated), logistic regression methods are used instead.
As many have observed before us, trust is a tricky concept. (Barber 1983; Baier 1986;
Gambetta, ed., 1988; Hardin 1991, 1993, 1996; Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Braithwaite
and Levi, eds., 1998; Warren 1999), but we do not need to go into detail about its
subtleties and complications here. It is sufficient to offer a working definition of trust as
the belief that others will not, at worst, knowingly or willingly do you harm, and will, at
best, act in your interests. This is a close approximation to Hardin’s (1998: 12-15)
succinct definition of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, to Warren’s (1999: 311) observa-
tion that trust involves shared interests or lack of malice, and to Gambetta’s (1988: 217)
that trust involves the belief that others will perform in a way that is beneficial to us, or
at least not detrimental. It is, however, important to emphasise that this paper is concerned
with social trust – that is inter-personal or horizontal trust between citizens, rather than
the political trust between citizens and political elites, or citizen confidence in political
institutions. Many have written about the relationship between social and political trust,
and between social trust and democracy, and some have argued that the relationship
between them is a complex and indirect one. In this paper, however, we make no
assumptions about political trust, or about the relationship between social and political
trust.5
The analysis of the data proceeds through three main steps. In each case the
Euromodule survey data was not pooled, but examined country by country. In the first
step we sorted a set of thirty-four independent variables (see Appendix 1) according to
their relevance to the six main theories of the origins of social trust discussed above. Some
of these variables were themselves composites of a bank of as many as fourteen
questionnaire items. Even so, with thirty-four variables it was necessary to reduce the
number. This was done by selecting a few of the strongest or ‘winning’ variables from
the longer lists. Since the interest is, in the first instance, to compare the power of different
theories of trust, the final list was limited to no more than three variables for each of the
theories, plus the socio-demographic controls. The criteria for the selection was (a) the
strength and significance of bivariate correlations between trust and the independent
variables, and (b) the combination of variables in the final regressions that have the
strongest association with trust. Those selected for the final regressions appear in Tables
4b to 10b (see Appendix 2).6
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The second step of the analysis consisted of running a series of country-by-country
multiple-logistic regressions, in order to get a first impression of the statistical power of
blocs of variables. For this purpose the maximum and minimum influence of each bloc
of variables was computed. This is because the ‘real’ impact of each bloc is not easy to
ascertain. Not only are some of the theories mutually reinforcing, rather than competing
or mutually exclusive, but the operationalisation and measurement of them tends to be
overlapping and reinforcing to some extent, as well. For example, those with high social
status tend to report higher levels of optimism, and higher levels of optimism are also
associated with more favourable views of social conditions. Therefore, the maximum
influence of any given variable on its own is likely to be an over-estimation of its real
effect, to the extent that it shares its influence with other closely associated variables.
Correspondingly, the minimum influence of any given bloc of variables is likely to be an
under-estimation, to the extent that it attributes common variance to other variables. In
other words, the real impact of any given bloc of variables is likely to be somewhere
between the minimum and the maximum.
Table 3 summarises the results of the second step of the analysis for each of the seven
countries. The pseudo R square can be interpreted as a measure of the strength of the
association between social trust and the independent variables. For example, societal
conditions in Slovenia seem to play a crucial role for trust. The minimal influence (R
square = 0.12) is even higher than the maximum (0.10), which means, in turn, that societal
conditions improve the strength of their association with trust, when all the other blocs
of variables are entered into the regression. In contrast, socio-economic status has a
substantially higher maximum (0.09) than minimum score (0.02), which suggests that a
large amount of common variance may be attributed to other variables.
The third and final step in the analysis involves running stepwise logistic regressions
on social trust for each country. Since our aim is to determine which type of variable
explains trust best, we have taken the most cautious, the most demanding, and the most
conservative step of picking blocs of variables according to their minimum influence.7 For
each country, the stepwise logistic regression is built up by entering one bloc at a time,
starting with the one with the largest minimum influence.
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Table 3: Maximum and minimum influence of blocs of variables on trust: summary table
Country Bloc 
influ-
ence* 
A: 
Demo-
graphic 
charac-
teristics 
B: 
Persona-
lity 
C: 
Success 
and well-
being 
D: 
Social 
net-
works 
E: 
Volun-
tary 
organi-
zation 
F: 
Com-
munity 
G: 
Societal 
con-
ditions 
South Korea max .01 .01 .05 .04 .01 .02 .02 
 min .01 .00 .03 .03 .00 .01 .01 
         
max .04 .06 .07 .03 .05 .04 .04 Switzerland 
min .01 .01 .02 .01 .03 .01 .01 
         
East Germany max .03 .08 .15 .08 .05 .08 .11 
 min .03 .03 .07 .04 .04 .03 .03 
         
West Germany max .02 .03 .04 .06 .02 .01 .05 
 min .00 .01 .01 .04 .00 .00 .03 
         
Spain max .03 .03 .07 .06 .01 .01 .02 
 min .00 .00 .03 .03 .00 .00 .02 
         
Hungary max .06 .04 .05 .05 .02 .04 .05 
 min .02 .01 .01 .03 .02 .01 .04 
         
SIovenia max .05 .03 .09 .04 .01 .06 .10 
 min .01 .04 .02 .04 .01 .04 .12 
 
Notes: *Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Entries are results from logistic regressions, dependent variable trust = yes.
Data: Euromodule 1999, 2000, 2001.
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3.2 Results
The results of the final regressions are shown in Tables 4a and 4b (Slovenia) to 10a – 10b
(South Korea) (see Appendix 2). We will not discuss each country in detail, since we are
mainly interested, in the first instance, in cross-national patterns, but will briefly compare
the two European countries with the lowest and highest trust scores, Slovenia and
Switzerland, in order to explain the figures, before looking at the overall picture. Table
4a shows that five blocs of variables contribute significantly to the explanation of trust
in Slovenia. The two strongest are clearly societal conditions and community character-
istics, but social net-works, personality characteristics, and success and well being are
also significant. Individual demographic characteristics and membership of voluntary
organisations are insignificant.
Table 4b presents the Slovenian results in greater and more revealing detail. What is
most notable is that all three of the societal conditions variables are significant, as are two
of the community characteristics. It seems clear that what matters for social trust among
Slovenians is how people feel about social conflict and political equality, and how they
see their local community. Nothing else seems to matter much, if at all.
This national picture is very different from that presented by Switzerland (Tables 9a
and 9b). Here significant variables are scattered over six of the seven blocs, and in the
final regression societal and individual, as well as subjective and objective variables
make a significant contribution. In contrast, the bloc of variables that is most important
in Slovenia, societal conditions, has a relatively modest impact in Switzerland. However,
the two countries are similar in that social networks and success and well-being have a
modestly strong association with social trust. In sum, a comparison of Slovenia and
Switzerland suggests some patterns, but they are not particularly clear or strong ones.
The question is, however, whether there are strong and clear patterns across all six
nations? To tackle this question Table 11 reduces the complexity of the final regression
models to their most basic simplicity, showing the contribution of each of the seven blocs
of variables for the seven countries. The table suggests the following conclusions:
1. Three theories do well in explaining trust; societal conditions, social networks, and
success and well being. In each country one or more of these blocs exert the strongest
influence. In comparison, the other theories generally do rather little, if anything, for
trust.
2. Perceived societal conditions, (conflict between the rich and poor, management and
workers, and nationals and immigrants, freedom to participate, job opportunities,
and satisfaction with public safety, and with democratic institutions) are most
strongly associated with trust. In four of the seven countries, societal conditions have
medium to very strong effects, and in two of them they are the strongest.
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3. Personality theory, community theory, and voluntary organisations theory do rather
poorly, having a low to medium strong association with trust in a few cases, but none
at all in others.
4. There is little evidence that membership of voluntary organisations is associated with
trust. It is rather weakly significant in only three countries. In contrast, being
involved with informal networks of friends is an significant correlate of trust in all
seven countries.
5. Demographic characteristics (gender, age, and education) are not closely associated
with trust. Only in Switzerland is gender significant, and here, as in the USA
(Patterson 1999: 173-4) women are less trusting then men.
6. The hypothesis that the relative impact of societal and individual variables varies in
low and high trust societies is given some degree of support, although only seven
cases is not enough to draw any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, there seems to be
a shift in the relative strength of variables as one moves from the lowest trust societies
to the highest. In South Korea, Switzerland, and East Germany, personal success and
well-being are the strongest sources of trust. In the lower trust societies either social
networks or societal conditions seem to be stronger. In Hungary and Slovenia,
especially, social theories are stronger than individual ones.
7. Trust is not well explained by any bloc of variables or any combinations of blocs.
Only two countries have ‘very strong’ entries, the number of ‘not significant’ and
‘low’ entries greatly outnumbers the ‘strong’ and ‘very strong’ entries, and the value
of the pseudo R square for the total model is normally less than .18. Only in East
Germany (.38) and Slovenia (.30) is the pseudo R square substantial.
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These conclusions are based on a comparison of blocs of variables associated with
different theoretical approaches. If we shift the focus of attention from blocs of variables
to individual variables (see Tables 4b – 10b) some strong conclusions emerge.
1. Contrary to the social-psychological theories, optimism and being in control of ones
own life is rarely associated with social trust. It appears in the country regressions in
only one case (Switzerland), and then only weakly. Our results show that optimism
and control are associated with success and well-being, but the latter are more
generally and more strongly associated with trust. This, in turn, suggests that it is not
early socialisation, but adult experiences that are important for trust.
Table 11: Strength of independent variables on social trust: summary table
 High trust 
societies 
     Low trust 
societies 
% trust 60 43 35 32 28 18 14 
 South 
Korea 
Switzer-
land 
East  
Germany 
West 
Germany 
Spain Hungary Slovenia 
Societal conditions low low strong medium low MEDIUM 
VERY 
STRONG 
Social networks low low medium MEDIUM STRONG medium low 
Success and well-
being 
MEDIUM MEDIUM 
VERY 
STRONG 
low medium n. s. low 
Personality n. s. low medium low n. s. n. s. low 
Community  n. s. low n. s. n. s. n. s. low strong 
Voluntary 
organizations n. s. medium medium n. s. n. s. low n. s. 
Demographic 
characteristics n. s. low n. s. low n. s. low n. s. 
 
Classification: Very strong influence = Nagelkerke’s R square for bloc > .099;
strong influence = Nagelkerke’s R square for bloc > .066;
medium influence = Nagelkerke’s R square for bloc > .033;
low influence = Nagelkerke’s R square for bloc <= .033;
n. s. = not significant.
Bold capital letters: strongest influence in the country.
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2. Subjective measures of success and well-being (life satisfaction, satisfaction with
standard of living, low anxiety) do better than objective ones (standard of living,
occupation, and income). In particular, anxiety is associated with distrust. In other
words, while those who are satisfied with life are not necessary trusting, but those
who are anxious are often distrustful.
3. There is little support for the claim that the educated are more trusting. Education is
significant in only two of the country regressions. Given the strength of the
association between trust and education in most studies this is a surprising finding.
4. More positively, two sorts of variables seem to be most consistently associated with
trust – conflict and safety, and a network of friends. Versions of the societal conflict
measures are significant in all the country regressions. Sometimes two or more
different indicators of social conflict are significant in the same regression. In
addition, public safety, and community safety at night also appear in five of the six
regressions. There may well be a good reason for both conflict and safety variables
appearing in the regressions together, if we assume that low conflict societies are
relatively safe ones. At any rate, trust appears to be greater in societies where people
believe that social conflicts are not acute, and where they believe that levels of public
safety are high.
5. The second positive finding concerns the fact that one or other of the social networks
measures appears in all of the seven country regressions, most usually with strong
or fairly strong statistical significance. Sometimes two social network variables are
significant in the same regression. It was suggested earlier that close networks of
personal friends might be more important in the ex-communist societies, but this
appears not to be the case. The ‘friends’ measure is more significant in West
Germany than in Hungary and Slovenia, and not much stronger in East Germany
than in West Germany. It is possible that the personal networks are more important
for the older age groups in central Europe who came of age under Communism, and
less important for younger, post-Communist age groups. This does not appear to be
the case. In neither Hungary, nor East Germany, nor Slovenia is there any strong or
consistent association between age and trust. Therefore, we draw the conclusion that
informal social networks are important for social trust, in western countries just as
much as in pre- and post-Communist central European countries.
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4 Conclusions
The literature on social trust contains different theories of the origins and determinants
of social trust. It also contains many conflicting empirical findings, even within the same
country and especially in cross-national research. In this paper we identify six main
theories of trust, ranging from bottom–up, individual ones to top-down, societal ones.
These theories run in parallel with different interpretations of the concept of trust itself.
Some see it is a social-psychological property of individuals. People are ‘trusters’ or
distrusters’ according to how they were brought up, or according to their experience of
later life. Others argue that trust is a social property and a contextual variable.  Individuals
don’t ‘have’ it as a personal attribute, so much as evaluate the society in which they live
as generally trustworthy or untrustworthy. The more people believe that others are to be
trusted, the more they will act in a trustworthy manner themselves, and the more they will
reinforce the virtuous circle of trust. In this sense trust is a contextual or emergent property
of social systems, which means that it is a social good that is fortified by constant use.
In this study three of the six theories of trust fare rather poorly and three do better. We
find rather little evidence to support the social-psychological theory that trust is part of
a core personality syndrome that includes personal optimism and the belief that one is in
control of one’s own life. Nor is there a strong or widespread association between trust
and membership of voluntary organisations. There is a link between them in three of the
seven countries, but it is not close, it varies between different types of organisations, and
it is not enough to support the great weight of expectations placed upon voluntary
organisations by social capital theory. Voluntary organisations do not seem to do much,
if anything for generalised trust in most countries. Nor are community characteristics, as
a bloc of variables, closely associated with trust (only Slovenia is different in this respect).
Neither city size, nor type of community, nor satisfaction with neighbourhoods are
important. At the same time it is interesting to note that the one community characteristics
that does appear as significant in six of the seven countries, is the feeling of safety in the
streets at night. This is consistent with the conclusion (noted below) that lack of conflict
and safety in the community is good for generating social trust.
And last among our negative findings, there is little evidence to suggest that trust is
associated with the personal demographic characteristics of age, gender, and education.
The absence of an association with education is surprising and not consistent with many
other studies. The explanation may be that education is closely related to, and a major
cause of, success and well-being in life, and it is the latter that is more closely associated
with trust. The Euromodule’s battery of questions dealing with success and well-being
makes it possible to use the survey to test the relative weight of these items against
education, and, for the most part education turns out to be relatively unimportant.
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Three theories do quite well. First and foremost, societal conditions of conflict and
safety are statistically significant in all seven country regressions, and they are strong or
very strong in three of them. Generalised social trust tends to be high among citizens who
believe that there are few severe social conflicts and where the sense of public safety is
high. This is consistent with the theory that socially homogeneous societies, with shared
understandings and low levels of conflict, are more likely to be trusting than societies
with deep social and economic cleavages.
Second, membership of informal social networks is significant in all countries. In
some cases two or more social network variables are significant in the same country
regression. This is true not just of central European societies, such as Hungary, Slovenia,
and East Germany, where informal network were thought to have played a particularly
important role under Communist regimes, but also in the west.
And third, success and well-being theory performs quite well in six of the seven
countries. There is, it seems, quite a lot in the suggestion that those who are successful
in life can afford to trust more, or are more inclined by their personal experience to do so.
In particular, anxiety, as the reverse of success and well-being, is associated with distrust:
the successful and satisfied are inclined to trust, but the anxious are more often distrustful.
This raises the possibility that social-psychology theory is right after all, but that instead
of pessimism and lack of control as core personality variables, we should substitute
anxiety. The Euromodule survey does not support this interpretation. It measures anxiety
as a composite of five questions about exhaustion, depression, trembling, feeling keyed
up, and having frightening thoughts. These might be the products of early socialisation,
but the evidence shows strong associations between anxiety and lack of adult success and
well-being. The highest anxiety scores are registered by the lowest income and social
class groups, and by the unemployed (Delhey 2002), which suggests that trust and
distrust is less the result of early socialisation than of adult life experiences.
Of the three successful theories, one is macro-societal (social conflict and safety), one
is micro-social (personal networks), and one individual (success, well-being, and
anxiety). We cannot, therefore, draw the conclusion that societal theories are more or less
powerful than individual ones. Each seems to play a part. Is there any truth in the idea
that different theories work best in societies with different levels of trust? Looking again
at Table 11 suggests there may be. In the low trust societies of Hungary and Slovenia
societal theory seems to work best, perhaps because of the recent social traumas in these
two countries. In the medium trust societies of West Germany, East Germany, and Spain,
social network theory works well, and in the high trust societies of Korea and Switzerland
success and well-being theory is strongest. We should emphasise, again, that it is unwise
to base too much on only seven cases, but nonetheless, it is worth noting that if different
theories of trust do work best in societies with different trust levels, then the exact pattern
is not the expected one. We anticipated that individual theories would work best in low
trust societies and societal ones in high trust societies. In fact the reverse seems to be the
case. This may have something to do with the fact that our two low trust societies happen
to have experienced revolutionary change in the very recent past, so that societal events
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have overwhelmed individual circumstances. Societal conditions also play a strong role
in East Germany, but not quite as strong as success and well-being variables, perhaps
because unification with West Germany has cushioning the societal shocks caused by the
fall of the Berlin wall.
We can say rather little about causes and effects. Do people feel successful, satisfied,
and happy because they trust, or is it the other way round? We suspect that the causal
arrow flows from success in life and happiness to trust, because it is less plausible to argue
that the trusting are able to make a success of their life, than that success makes it easier
to trust. Success in life is likely to be the result of many different factors, rather than
simply the product of a single personality variable. And is integration into an informal
social network likely to generate trust, or is it that the trusting have good social contacts?
It is impossible to tell from our data. But the association between societal conditions and
trust may be easier to explain, and here a top-down model seems most appropriate. The
belief that society is deeply divided by social and economic conflicts in East Germany,
Hungary, and Slovenia is scarcely likely to be the result of low levels of trust in these
countries. Lack of trust is not the cause of social and political upheaval and conflict in
these countries, but the expression of them.
These conclusions suggest that future research on generalised social trust might do
rather better to pay less attention to individual variations in trust within countries, and
more to cross-national comparisons. It does not follow that we should throw out
individual level theories. For example, at the individual level membership of voluntary
organisations seems to do little for trust, but it may still be that at the national level an
aggregate variable such as the density of voluntary associations is associated with cross-
national variations in trust, which, in turn, is dependent on rates of individual participa-
tion in voluntary associations. But it does suggest that the next step in research might
deploy a range of national variables measuring income and income distribution, demo-
cratic development, social cleavages and conflict, and historical experience. At any rate,
the results of this research suggest that individual social-psychological and demographic
characteristics are less likely to explain trust than objective and subjective measures of
macro-social conditions and the strength of informal social networks.
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Notes
1 For recent general work on the subject see, for example, Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Warren 1999;
Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Gambetta 1988; Luhmann 1979; Coleman 1990; Ostrom 1990; Sztomka
1996, 1999; Hollis 1998. In addition much of the recent work on contemporary political attitudes and
behaviour makes extensive reference to trust – see Putnam 1993, 2000; Edwards, Foley, and Diani,
eds., 2001; van Deth et. al., eds., 1999; Portes 1998; Nye et al., eds., 1997; Norris, ed., 1999; Pharr and
Putnam, eds., 2000; Eisenstadt 1995;  Hall 1999; Pharr 2000; Bianco 1994; King 1997; Listhaug
1995; Kaase and Newton 1995; Rose and Mischler 1997.
2 One response is to emphasise the importance, not of organisations in general, but particular kinds that
bridge between different social groups, rather than bond within social groups. Unfortunately, we have
no evidence in the Euromodule study about bridging and bonding groups, so this particular proposi-
tion is beyond the scope of the present paper.
3 Differences between individual and aggregate variation is important, insofar as theories that work at
one level may not work at the other – see Newton 2001.
4 Sweden is also a Euromodule country, but does not include a measure of trust in its questionnaire.
Euromodule surveys have also been carried out in Austria, Italy, and Turkey but the data are not yet
available.
5 We note, however, that there is no statistically significant association between social trust and confi-
dence in democracy in the six country regressions that follow. This is consistent with earlier work that
finds no evidence at the individual level to link social and political trust (Kaase 1999: 14; Torcal and
Montero 1999: 181; Newton and Norris 2000).
6 The variables appearing in the country regressions vary from one country to another. This is because
we wanted to select the strongest variables in each country to represent each theory, rather than run
exactly the same list of variables for all countries. By using the strongest variables we not only get the
best regression results, but we also test the theories by using the best combination of variables to
represent them. If they do not seem to work even under these, the most favourable circumstances, there
is all more reason to doubt their validity. It is worth pointing out that running exactly the same list of
independent variables would only reduce the overall strength of association with trust. Given our
interest in testing theories with the best possible measures we decided to run the strongest variables in
each country, rather than a common set of variables for all countries.
7 That is, when it comes to testing theories against each other, we choose the most conservative strategy,
but when it comes to picking variables as indicators of different theories, we pick the strongest ones
(Footnote 6 above).
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Appendix 1
Possible determinants of social trust available in Euromodule surveys
Indicator Scaling 
 A: Demographic characteristics (control variables) 
Gender 1 = female; 0 = male 
Age Open 
Education ISCED 1997 scheme, collapsed to 3 categories: primary, 
secondary, tertiary 
 B: Personality theory 
Optimism 1 = agree not at all, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat 
agree, 4 = completely agree 
Influence on today’s problems 1 = agree not at all, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat 
agree, 4 = completely agree 
Life has become complicated 1 = agree not at all, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat 
agree, 4 = completely agree 
 C: Success and well-being theory 
Satisfaction standard of living 11-point scale (0 to 10); 0 = completely dissatisfied, 10 = 
completely satisfied 
Satisfaction household income 11-point scale (0 to 10) 
Satisfaction present job 11-point scale (0 to 10) 
Life satisfaction 11-point scale (0 to 10) 
Happiness 1 = very unhappy, 2 = not too happy, 3 = pretty happy, 4 = very 
happy. 
Anxiety score Score over 5 items: exhaustion, depressed, tremble, keyed up; 
frightening thoughts; count “yes” 
Actual standard of living score List of 22 items; count “have” 
Deprivation score List of 22 items; count “can not afford“ 
Household income Respondents reported household income, open question, 
additionally income categories (if refused)  
Financial situation of household, 
compared to 1 year ago,  
1 = clearly deteriorated, 2 = deteriorated somewhat, 3 = 
remained the same, 4 = improved somewhat, 5 = clearly 
improved 
Ability to make ends meet 1 = with great difficulty, 2 = with some difficulty, 3 = fairly easily, 
4 = very easily 
Social class (self positioning) 5 categories, collapsed to 3 categories: lower class/working class, 
middle class, upper middle class/upper class 
Occupational status (present or last) 5 categories: unskilled/semi-skilled workers, skilled 
workers/foremen, employee/civil servant lower level, 
employee/civil servant higher level, self employed 
Unemployment experience during  
last 5 years 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
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(continued) 
 D: Voluntary organization theory 
Membership in associations/  
organizations 
9 association types: trade union, political party, neighbourhood 
association, environmental association, charity association, 
church related association, cultural group, sports club/leisure 
club, other; 1 = yes; 0 = no 
No membership at all 1 = no member, 0 = member 
 E: Social network theory 
Close friends 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Number of close friends Open 
Frequency of contacts  0 = no friends, 1 = infrequently, 2 = at least one a month, 3 = at 
least once a weak, 4 = nearly daily 
Feeling lonely 1 = agree not at all, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat 
agree, 4 = completely agree 
 F: Community theory 
Town size*** Metric 
Feel safe at night walking in home area 1 = very unsafe, 2 = rather unsafe, 3 = rather safe, 4 = very safe 
Satisfaction neighbourhood 11-point scale (0 to 10) 
Affected by crime incidents Score over 3 items: get things stolen, be harassed or threatened, 
be beaten and hurt; count “yes” 
 G: Societal conditions theory 
Perception of social conflicts 6 conflicts: poor and rich people, unemployed and people with 
jobs, management and workers, young and old people, men and 
women, nationals and immigrants; 1 = no conflicts, 2 = only 
weak conflicts, 3 = strong conflicts, 4 = very strong conflicts 
also: overall conflict score, count “3” to “4” 
Satisfaction with public safety 11-point scale (0 to 10) 
Satisfaction with democracy * 11-point scale (0 to 10) 
Achievement of public goods ** 13 public goods: freedom of political participation, freedom to 
choose occupation, protection environment, protection private 
property, just distribution of wealth, equality men and women, 
quality of life chances, freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion/faith, protection from crime, social security, solidarity 
with poor and needy, chance to get a job; 1 = not at all 
achieved, 2 = rather not achieved, 3 = rather achieved, 4 = fully 
achieved 
also: overall achievement score, count “3” to “4” 
 
* Only available for Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, and South Korea.
** Only available for Hungary, Slovenia, and South Korea.
*** Slovenia: type of community (5 categories), South Korea: type of community
(3 categories).
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Appendix 2
Slovenia
Table 4a: Summary of logistic regressions: Slovenia
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi -
cance 
Model chi 
square/df 
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Societal conditions theory  40.358/3 .108 .000 40.358/3 .108 84.0 
+ Community theory 30.231/6 .072 .000 70.589/9 .184 83.8 
+ Social network theory 13.545/3 .033 .004 84.134/12 .217 83.3 
+ Personality theory 12.407/3 .030 .006 96.542/15 .247 83.6 
+ Success and well-being theory 13.783/4 .032 .008 110.325/19 .279 85.1 
+ Demographic characteristics 6.676/8 .015 .154 n.s.  117.001/23 .294 85.4 
+ Voluntary organization theory 2.836/3 .007 .418 n.s.  119.837/26 .301 84.9 
Total model    119.837/26 .301 84.9 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 663.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Slovenia 1999.
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Table 4b: Total regression model: Slovenia
Dependent variable trust = yes
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -5.515** 11.244 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) -.467 2.774 
   Age .007 .599 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary -.699 1.940 
      Tertiary .173 .271 
Personality   
   Optimism .231 2.033 
   Cannot influence problems -.362* 5.304 
   Life so complicated .227 1.794 
Success and well-being   
   Standard of living .036 .495 
   Life satisfaction .162 2.529 
   Class affiliation (ref.: lower/working class)   
      Middle class .601 2.752 
      Upper middle/upper class  .960 3.442 
Social networks   
   Having friends -.633 .798 
   Number close friends .098*** 12.836 
   Frequency of contacts .150 .680 
Voluntary organizations   
   Sports club, leisure club -.270 .672 
   Trade union .311 1.357 
   Cultural group .381 .846 
Community characteristics   
   Type of community (ref.: rural/village)   
      Large city 1.167** 7.011 
      Suburb of large city .998* 6.520 
      Middle-size city .798* 4.617 
      Small city -.255 .338 
   Satisfaction neighbourhood .065 .792 
   Feel safe at night .481* 4.345 
Societal conditions   
   Conflict rich - poor -.557** 9.134 
   Conflict management - workers -.521** 8.012 
   Achieved: freedom of political participation .459* 6.576 
 
Notes: Valid N = 663.
Model Chi-square: 119.837 / df 26, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 85.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .301; Mc Fadden’s R square: .219.
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Data: Euromodule Slovenia 1999.
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Hungary
Table 5a: Summary of logistic regressions: Hungary
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi -
cance 
Model chi 
square/df 
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Societal conditions theory  35.189/3 .053 .000 35.189/3 .053 80.3 
+ Social network theory 36.032/3 .052 .000 71.220/6 .105 80.2 
+ Demographic characteristics  22.555/4 .021 .000 93.776/10 .136 80.5 
+ Voluntary organization theory 11.373/3 .016 .010 105.148/13 .152 81.6 
+ Community theory 8.749/3 .012 .033 113.897/16 .164 80.8 
+ Success and well-being theory 5.399/3 .007 .145 n.s.  119.296/19 .171 80.8 
+ Personality theory 3.236/3 .005 .357 n.s.  122.532/22 .176 81.0 
Total model    122.532/22 .176 81.0 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 1045.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Hungary 1999.
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Table 5b: Total regression model: Hungary
Dependent variable trust = yes
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -2.620** 9.044 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) -.227 1.609 
   Age .002 .132 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary -.141 .361 
      Tertiary .805*** 13.051 
Personality   
   Optimism .165 2.145 
   Cannot influence problems .007 .004 
   Life so complicated .141 1.579 
Success and well-being   
   Satisfaction with household income .027 .380 
   Financial situation household, now vs.  
   one year ago 
.129 1.631 
   Anxiety -.105 1.684 
Social networks   
   Having friends 1.052* 5.650 
   Number close friends .133** 7.985 
   Frequency of contacts -.283* 4.349 
Voluntary organizations   
   Church related association .534 .858 
   Cultural group 1.695* 6.673 
   Sports club, leisure club .578 2.635 
Community characteristics   
   Size of community .000 .300 
   Satisfaction neighbourhood .006 .028 
   Feel safe at night .226* 4.755 
Societal conditions   
   Conflict nationals vs. immigrants -.212* 4.437 
   Conflict management vs. workers -.301** 8.406 
   Achieved: chance to get a job .124 1.064 
 
Notes: Valid n = 1045.
Model Chi-square: 122.532 / df 22, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 81.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .176; Mc Fadden’s R square: .118.
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Data: Euromodule Hungary 1999.
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Spain
Table 6a: Summary of logistic regressions: Spain
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi -
cance 
Model chi 
square/df  
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Social network theory  87.520/3 .067 .000 87.520/3 .067 70.8 
+ Success and well-being theory 61.327/4 .045 .000 148.847/7 .112 71.5 
+ Societal conditions theory 19.288/3 .014 .000 168.136/10 .126 71.9 
+ Personality theory 2.410/3 .001 .492 n.s.  170.546/13 .127 71.9 
+ Demographic characteristics 5.519/4 .004 .238 n.s.  176.065/17 .131 71.5 
+ Community theory  5.773/3 .004 .123 n.s.  181.838 .135 71.3 
+ Voluntary organization theory 5.502 .004 .139 n.s.  187.340 .139 71.9 
Total model    187.340 .139 71.9 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 1824.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Spain 2000.
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Table 6b: Determinants of social trust: Spain
Dependent variable trust = yes
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -2.141*** 13.875 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) -.055 .232 
   Age .006 .124 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary .132 .933 
      Tertiary .297 1.865 
Personality   
   Optimism -.024 .116 
   Cannot influence problems -.046 .556 
   Life so complicated -.069 .875 
Success and well-being   
   Standard of living .030 2.788 
   Anxiety -.275*** 31.776 
   Class affiliation (ref.: lower/working class)   
      Middle class .130 1.142 
      Upper middle/upper class  -.106 .189 
Social networks   
   Having friends .257 2.502 
   Number close friends .137*** 18.988 
   Feeling lonely .113 2.731 
Voluntary organizations   
   Trade union .291 1.916 
   Cultural group .496 3.416 
   Sports club, leisure club .083 .259 
Community characteristics   
   Town size .001* 2.059 
   Satisfaction neighbourhood -.014 .161 
   Feel safe at night .162 3.274 
Societal conditions   
   Conflict management - workers -.147 3.787 
   Conflict nationals - immigrants -.061 .777 
   Satisfaction with public safety .066* 4.899 
 
Notes: Valid n = 1824.
Model Chi-square: 187.340 / df 23, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 72.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .139; Mc Fadden’s R square: .085.
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Data: Euromodule Spain 2000.
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West Germany
Table 7a: Summary of logistic regressions: West Germany
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi -
cance 
Model chi 
square/df  
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Social network theory  72.298/3 .059 .000 72.298/3 .059 69.3 
+ Societal conditions theory 66.704/3 .052 .000 139.002/6 .112 70.1 
+ Success and well-being theory 24.769/5 .019 .000 163.771/11 .131 69.6 
+ Personality theory 8.131/3 .006 .043 171.902/14 .137 69.2 
+ Community theory 5.717/4 .004 .221 n.s.  177.619/18 .141 70.3 
+ Demographic characteristics 9.181/3 .007 .027 186.799/21 .148 70.2 
+ Voluntary organization theory 4.355/3 .003 .226 n.s.  191.154/24 .151 70.4 
Total model    191.154/24 .151 70.4 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 1683.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Germany 1999.
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Table 7b: Determinants of social trust: West Germany
Dependent variable trust = yes
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -2.819*** 21.484 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) .002 .000 
   Age -.006 2.682 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary .159 .949 
      Tertiary .190 1.663 
Personality   
   Optimism .107 1.788 
   Cannot influence problems -.128 2.994 
   Life so complicated .107 1.812 
Success and well-being   
   Anxiety -.176** 7.803 
   Class affiliation (ref.: middle class)   
      Lower class -.715 1.186 
      Working class .035 .059 
      Upper middle/upper class .317 3.310 
   Financial situation household, now vs.  
   one year ago 
.101 1.470 
Social networks   
   Number close friends .090*** 25.239 
   Frequency of contacts .133* 6.665 
   Feeling lonely .061 .625 
Voluntary organizations   
   Other membership .344* 4.690 
   Cultural group .412 3.550 
   Sports club, leisure club .181 1.934 
Community characteristics   
   Town size .001 3.431 
   Satisfaction neighbourhood -.019 .424 
   Feel safe at night .020 .054 
Societal conditions   
   Conflicts -.097** 7.835 
   Satisfaction with public safety .090* 6.395 
   Satisfaction with democratic institutions .113*** 12.422 
 
Notes: Valid n = 1683.
Model Chi-square: 191.154 / df 24, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 70.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .151; Mc Fadden’s R square: .092.
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Data: Euromodule Germany 1999.
PAGE 39
JAN DELHEY, KENNETH NEWTON
East Germany
Table 8a: Summary of logistic regressions: East Germany
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi -
cance 
Model chi 
square/df  
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Success and well-being theory  40.633/8 .141 .000 40.633/8 .141 71.6 
+ Social network theory  14.045/3 .045 .003 54.677/11 .186 72.4 
+ Voluntary organization theory  13.643/3 .043 .003 68.321/14 .229 72.4 
+ Societal conditions theory  22.193/3 .066 .000 90.514/17 .295 75.5 
+ Community theory 6.498/3 .018 .090 n.s.  97.012/20 .313 75.7 
+ Personality theory  12.932/3 .036 .005 109.944/23 .349 76.0 
+ Demographic characteristics 9.465/5 .026 .092 n.s.  119.409/28 .375 78.6 
Total model    119.409/28 .375 78.6 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 387.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Germany 1999.
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Table 8b: Determinants of social trust: East Germany
Dependent variable trust = yes
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -4.582** 7.909 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) -.564 3.102 
   Age .008 .823 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary .527 .665 
      Tertiary/non-university -.335 .644 
      Tertiary/university .880 3.311 
Personality   
   Optimism .340 3.228 
   Cannot influence problems -.203 1.124 
   Life so complicated .571** 9.755 
Success and well-being   
   Life satisfaction .036 .140 
   Class affiliation (ref.: lower/working class)   
      Middle class -.080 .069 
      Upper middle/upper class 1.486 2.133 
   Occupation (ref.: employee/civil servant,  
   higher and medium level) 
  
      Other 1.449 3.759 
      Unskilled/semi skilled worker -7.084 .428 
      Skilled worker/foreman .687 2.817 
      Employee/civil servant, lower level -.108 .067 
      Self employed .454 .526 
Social networks   
   Number close friends .021 .271 
   Frequency of contacts .355** 9.854 
   Feeling lonely .066 .140 
Voluntary organizations   
   No membership (1 = no member) -.425 2.011 
   Church related association 3.198** 6.963 
   Environmental association 8.128 .018 
Community characteristics   
   Town size -.111 2.082 
   Satisfaction neighborhood -.026 .126 
   Feel safe at night .572** 7.097 
Societal conditions   
   Conflicts -.239* 6.228 
   Satisfaction with public safety .053 .341 
   Satisfaction with democratic institutions .063 .592 
 Notes: Valid n = 387.
Model Chi-square: 119.409 / df 28, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 79.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .375; Mc Fadden’s R square: .251.
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Data: Euromodule Germany 1999.
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Switzerland
Table 9a: Summary of logistic regressions: Switzerland
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi -
cance 
Model chi 
square/df  
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Voluntary organization theory 47.257/3 .049 .000 47.257/3 .049 59.4 
+ Success and well-being theory  53.558/3 .053 .000 100.815/6 .102 60.9 
+ Personality theory 27.615/3 .027 .000 128.431/9 .129 61.8 
+ Demographic characteristics  14.734/4 .014 .005 143.165/13 .143 62.6 
+ Community theory 22.316/3 .020 .000 165.481/16 .163 63.9 
+ Societal conditions theory 14.300/3 .014 .003 179.780/19 .176 65.1 
+ Social network theory 4.235/3 .004 .237 n.s.  184.015/22 .180 65.5 
Total model    184.015/22 .180 65.5 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 663.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Switzerland 2000.
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Table 9b: Determinants of social trust: Switzerland
Dependent variable trust = yes
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -2.542** 9.185 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) -.324* 5.800 
   Age .007 3.019 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary -.418 .073 
      Tertiary .349* 4.429 
Personality   
   Optimism .247*** 12.702 
   Cannot influence problems -.167* 6.717 
   Life so complicated -.071 .593 
Success and well-being   
   Anxiety -.188* 6.478 
   Standard of living .025 .990 
   Satisfaction with standard of living .093* 4.321 
Social networks   
   Having friends .181 1.046 
   Number close friends .023 1.491 
   Feeling lonely .021 .063 
Voluntary organizations   
   No membership (1 = no member) -.230 2.401 
   Environmental association .763*** 15.530 
   Charity association .234 2.007 
Community characteristics   
   Town size .001* 5.924 
   Satisfaction neighbourhood .005 .017 
   Feel safe at night .314** 11.499 
Societal conditions   
   Conflict rich - poor -.147 2.488 
   Conflict nationals - immigrants -.240** 7.803 
   Satisfaction with public safety .045 1.407 
 
Notes: Valid n = 1271.
Model Chi-square: 184.015 / df 22, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 66.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .180; Mc Fadden’s R square: .105.
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Data: Euromodule Switzerland 2000.
PAGE 43
JAN DELHEY, KENNETH NEWTON
South Korea
Table 10a: Summary of logistic regressions: South Korea
Dependent variable trust = yes
Determinant (bloc of variables) Bloc chi 
square/df 
Bloc 
pseudo R 
square* 
Bloc 
signifi-
cance 
Model chi 
square/df 
Model 
pseudo R 
square* 
Model % 
correct 
predictions 
Success and well-being theory  38.619/6 .052 .000 38.619/6 .052 61.8 
+ Social network theory  22.280/3 .029 .000 60.899/9 .081 63.6 
+ Societal conditions theory 8.588/3 .009 .035 69.487/12 .092 63.5 
+ Demographic characteristics  3.604/4 .004 .462 n.s. 73.091/16 .096 64.1 
+ Community theory 2.926/4 .004 .570 n.s. 76.017/20 .100 64.1 
+ Personality theory .383/3 .000 .944 n.s. 76.399/23 .100 63.5 
+ Voluntary organization theory 2.117/3 .003 .549 n.s. 78.516/26 .103 64.1 
Total model    78.516/26 .103 64.1 
 
Notes: * Nagelkerke’ s R square.
Valid n = 992.
Stepwise regression according to minimum influence.
Data: Euromodule Korea 2001.
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Table 10b: Determinants of social trust: South Korea
Dependent variable trust = yes
 
Variable Regression Coefficient B Wald 
Constant -.581 .408 
Personal demographic characteristics   
   Gender (1 = women) .268 3.459 
   Age .002 .098 
   Education level (ref.: secondary)   
      Primary -.072 .095 
      Tertiary -.070 .155 
Personality   
   Optimism .000 .000 
   Cannot influence problems .003 .001 
   Life so complicated -.056 .283 
Success and well-being   
   Satisfaction with standard of living .113* 5.022 
   Anxiety -.108 1.921 
   Income position (ref.: lowest quintile)   
      2. quintile -.072 .111 
      3. quintile -.221 .883 
      4. quintile .273 1.199 
      5. quintile .412 2.465 
Social networks   
   Having friends -.791** 7.945 
   Number close friends .087** 8.466 
   Feeling lonely .088 .660 
Voluntary organizations   
   No membership (1 = no member) .059 .073 
   Church related association .388 1.045 
   Cultural group ,575 .826 
Community characteristics   
   Type of community (ref.: large city)   
      Middle or small city -.225 2.284 
      Village or rural area -.117 .265 
   Satisfaction neighborhood .023 .212 
   Feel safe at night .079 .307 
Societal conditions   
   Conflict rich - poor -.111 1.127 
   Satisfaction with public safety .026 .272 
   Achieved: social security .214* 4.098 
 
Notes: Valid n = 992.
Model Chi-square: 78.516 / df 26, Significance .000.
% correct predictions: 64.
Nagelkerke’s R Square .103; Mc Fadden’s R square: .059.
Notes: Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Data: Euromodule Korea 2001.
